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THE REVIEW OF HOMICIDE CASES IN PENNSYL-
VANIA.
Important legal changes are frequently the result of efforts
to influence the determination in particular cases. No more strik-
ing example is to be found in Pennsylvania than the modification
of appellate procedure to secure the release of Paul Schoeppe,
convicted of murder in the first degree. The consequence was
the imposition of duties upon the Supreme Court in homicide
cases differing from the requirements of review where other
matters are involved. A consideration of the law as it existed in
1870, and the effect of the legislation passed during that year
may not be without interest.
In Pennsylvania, provision was early made for review of
minor criminal proceedings by the Provincial Court, but in case
of murder the trial was had before the judges of this tribunal
specially presiding in the various circuits.' General jurisdiction
of appeals by any party aggrieved was granted in 1722,2 by an. act
which gave authority to affirm, or reverse, the judgment entered
in the court below. To this was subsequently added the power to
modify.3 Following, however, the common law, consideration
was alone given to errors appearing upon the record, since the
statute of Westminster,4 conferring the right to bills of excep-
tions, had application to civil causes, and not to criminal proceed-
ings.5 Neither the testimony of witnesses, the rulings upon evi-
dence, the answers to the points, nor the charge of the court could
be brought upon the record for review,6 either directly, or indi-
rectly, by referring to the same in the motion for a new trial, or
in arrest of judgment.- The record alone was examined, and bills
of exceptions being without the sanction of a statute, had no
place in the administration of the criminal law.
'Act 1693, Provincial Laws, 223; re-enacted in 17oo, Bioren's Laws, Vol. I,
p. 32, Chaps. IOO, IOI.
2 Act March 22, 1722, Sec. 9, and Smith's Laws, 138.
'Act June 16, 1836.
'Statute Westminster 2d, 13 Edward I, C. 31.
'Haines v. Com., 99 Pa. 410.
" Middleton v. CoM., 2 Watts, 285.
Sampson v. Com., 5 W. & S. 385.
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That this limitation upon the defendant's right of review was
not considered a hardship, prior to 1856, is evidenced by the
declaration of Chief Justice Gibson, which well explains the then
point of view, when he said:
"Nor is this a defect in our system; at least, whatever it may
seem in theory, it is not a defect in practice; for the recollection of no
lawyer can point to an instance of injustice suffered or conviction
procured by straining the law against the accused. . . . As to a
severity of administration, the tendency to err is in the opposite di-
rection; and the prisoner has an additional and an all sufficient safe-
guard in the sympathies of the jury. But though convictions of the
innocent are unknown, acquittals of the guilty are abundant; and if
it were an object to increase their number, it could not be denied that
it would be promoted by the delay incident to a writ of error; for
when the public has become indifferent to the event, and the anger of
the injured party, which lent a temporary activity to the prosecution,
has subsided, above all, when the principal witnesses are dead or
dispersed, an acquittal on a second trial is pretty much a matter of
course. . . . Besides, it is proved by all experience, that the effi-
cacy of punishment depends on its promptness and certainty, and
that the more we multiply the chances of eventual escape, the more
we take from its influence. . . . We are unwilling to introduce
into the administration of the criminal justice, disorders so preju-
dicial to the general weal, by departing from a construction which
has prevailed without interruption for near two centuries."18
Notwithstanding this expression of judicial thought, the
legislature in 1856 9 provided for more extended review in homi-
cide cases, and permitted exceptions to "any decision of the court
upon any point of evidence or law," which shall have been "noted
by the court and filed of record, as in civil cases." Written opin-
ions on points submitted were required of the court below, but
only such matters of substance as were formally excepted to,
were made the subject of review.10 The seventh section provided
for objections to the charge, but it is to be noted that this portion
of the act was omitted when the general revision of the law of
criminal procedure was made and adopted." The manner of
securing leave to appeal was likewise fixed by the act of I856, and
Middleton v. Com., 2 Watts, 285.
'Act Nov. 6, 1856, Sec. 7, in P. L. of 1857, App., p. 795.
Fife v. Corn., - Pa. 429, 435.
"Act March 31, i86o, P. L. 44o, Secs. 57 and 58.
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a similar regulation is found in section 59 of the procedure act.
The latter contains, however, an additional method of obtaining
an allocatur, in that the attorney general is given power to allow
the writ.
1 2
This was the state of the law in 1869 when Paul Schoeppe
was indicted for the murder of Maria Steinnecke. The defend-
ant, a young physician of pleasing personality, educated in Ger-
many, was accused of having killed his patient by the administra-
tion of poison; and, after a hearing, at which much expert testi-
mony was introduced, a conviction of murder in the first degree
was had. A motion for a new trial was overruled by the court be-
low, and the defendant was sentenced to be executed.13
An agitation on behalf of the prisoner was immediately be-
gun, and many of the important medical associations throughout
the country passed resolutions denouncing his conviction as based
on unworthy expert opinion. Within thirty days after the sen-
tence an application for an allocatur was duly made to Chief
Justice Thompson of the Supreme Court, which-Justices
Read and Sharswood concurring-was refused. Request was
then presented to Governor Geary for a pardon, but the decision
of the executive was adverse, and a warrant for the execution of
Schoeppe was issued.
Honorable F. Carroll Brewster, attorney general of the state,
was then applied to, and in his official capacity granted leave to
appeal, a power possessed by virtue of section 33 of the Criminal
Procedure Act; as already noted, but rarely exercised. The writ
of error so allowed was returned to the Supreme Court, and the
legislation governing the right of review was again discussed by
Justice Read. 14 On February 14, 187o, the judgment was
affirmed and the record was remitted.
In the meantime, the friends of the defendant had secured
the passage by the legislature of an act which gave to defendants
in murder cases the right to appeal without leave, and required
22 Section 33; a re-enactment of the Act of April 13, 1791. and Sec. 9 of
the Act of June 16, 1836.
"For charge of the court and opinion overruling motion for new trial, see
Schoeppe v. Com., 2 Leg. Gaz. 15; I Leg. Gaz. 78.
1 65 Pa. 51, 52.
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that all records so removed to the Supreme Court should be re-
viewed by the judges, both as to law and evidence, to determine
whether the ingredients necessary to constitute murder in the
first degree were provei to exist. The legislation was made appli-
cable to writs of error tjien pending. It was anticipated that this
law would be in force before the disposition of the writ granted
with leave of the attorney general, but a veto by the governor
caused delay, so that it did not become effective until February
15, a day after the decision was rendered by Justice Read.' 5 Not-
withstanding this fact, a second writ of error was immediately
sued out, and the record was returned with the charge of the
court, the prisoner's points and answers, and the bills of excep-
tions to decisions on the evidence, and to the charge. The Com-
monwealth entered a plea of former judgment, and, after argu-
ment, its contention was sustained,'" and the record was remitted
for the purpose of execution.
Subseqently, another act of assembly was passed by which
the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Cumberland County was
given power to open and set aside the judgment of conviction. An
application was made to the trial judge, Hon. James H. Graham,
who, after hearing, refused to interfere. Later, in the same year,
he was defeated for re-election in a contest in which the Schoeppe
case played an important part, and his successor, Hon. B. F.
Junkin, upon application, granted a new trial, which resulted in
an acquittal.
Thus the act of February 15, 1870, came to be the law regu-
lating appeals in homicide cases. Of it the Supreme Court said:'-
"It is not improper, before closing, to say a few words in refer-
ence to the Act of 1870, to draw attention to some of its defects, and
to the radical change in our criminal jurisprudence it will produce.
It was passed for this case, but owing to the governor's veto it came
too late. It is another evidence that laws which are the offspring of
feeling are seldom wisely framed. It commands this court to review
the evidence, and to determine whether the ingredients to constitute
murder in the first degree were proved to exist, and yet, in forgetful-
ness of the former law, it provides no means to take, preserve and
'Act February I5, 187o, P. L. 15.
"65 Pa. 55.
Schoeppe v. Com., 65 Pa. 58.
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bring up the evidence. This, the first attempt to act under it, proves
its inefficiency, the judge below returning to our certiorari that he
was not able to make the return of the evidence."
The permission to appeal without special leave, granted by
this legislation, was deemed of sufficient importance to be incor-
porated into the Constitution of 1874, which directs that:
"In all cases of felonious homicide, and in such other criminal
cases as may be provided for by law, the accused after conviction
and sentence may remove the indictment, record and all proceedings
to the Supreme Court for review."'Is
Though the privilege is thus protected against interference
by the legislature, yet it does not prevent the enactment of reason-
able regulations as to procedure, such as limiting the time during
which the writ must be sued out ;19 or, be taken to constitute it a
supersedeaS.
20
The so-called Schoeppe act met with scant approval from the
appellate court, when first considered, and the result was an inter-
pretation of its provisions without liberality, notwithstanding the
broad terms used. Justice Dean, in speaking of this, said:
21
"I am aware that this court has given a very narrow construc-
tion to these comprehensive words, and has decided that they do not
empower the court to review the question of the guilt or innocence of
the prisoner."
Chief Justice Thompson expressed the views of the court
upon its scope soon after its passage.22 It was remarked:
"We have listened to the able and zealous argument of the
prisoner's counsel as if on a motion for a new trial; we could find
no fault with that, for it in fact was a method of showing that the
ingredients of murder in the first degree had not been proved. But
our duty under the act is widely different. A court on hearing a mo-
tion for a new trial, judges of the action of the jury on the testimony
'Art. V, Sec. 24. The Act of May 19, 1874, P. L 219, Sec. i, re-affirms
this right and provides for exceptions to any decision of the court, and the
sealing of a bill in the same manner as is practiced in civil cases.
" Sayres v. Com., 88 Pa. 291.
"Act May 19, 1897, P. L. 67, Sec. 4; Com. v. Hill, 185 Pa. 585.
'Dissenting opinion, Com. v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507.
"Grant v. Com., 71 Pa. 495, 505 (1872).
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on both sides, and considers whether too much or too little weight
has been given to features for the whole of the testimony in view of
its intrinsic character; the manner in which it has been given by the
witnesses, tfieir apparent bias, intelligence or want of it, and charac-
ter. All this has been before and under the eye of the court, and
they can say on a calm reconsideration of it all, whether justice does,
or does not, require a new trial. This court cannot do-this, and the
act of assembly does not contemplate any such thing. Our duty is to
see whether there was evidence given in the case, which, if believed
by the jury, would furnish the elements, or 'ingredients,' as the act
says, of murder in the first degree, under our statutes on the subject,
via.: the corpus delicti, either 'killing by poison, lying in wait, or by
any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of any arson, rape, robbery or burglary.' To this extent is the
duty devolved on this court, of reviewing the facts in cases of con-
victions for murder in the first degree, by the act of 1870. It goes
no further towards enabling it to grant new trials. If there have
appeared in the testimony the ingredients to constitute murder in the
first degree, our power ceases. Whether the jury should or should
not have believed and relied on it, is what this court cannot examine
into. That must be inquired of on a motion for a new trial in the
court below, as formerly."
That the act should not be treated as a substitute for a mo-
tion for a new trial, where the weight of the testimony is to be
considered, has been frequently declared in subsequent cases.2 3 It
is, however, the duty of the court to determine whether compe-
tent evidence appeared, which would justify a finding that the
ingredients necessary to constitute murder in the first degree are
present ;24 but if there is any such testimony it must be accepted
as true, for it is not for the appellate court to pass upon its cred-.
ibility ;25 nor to determine whether the jury believed or relied
upon the facts proved . 2  Though the entire record is to be exam-
ined to determine the presence or absence of evidence establishing
the essential elements, this does not mean that it gives to the de-
" Staup v. Com., 74 Pa. 458; McGinnis v. Com., IO2 Pa. 66; Corn. v. Danz,
supra; Corn. v. Garrito, 222 Pa. 304; Com. v. Wendt, 258 Pa. 325; McCue v.
Com., 78 Pa. x85, i8g.
• " Com. v. Harris, 237 Pa. 597; Com. v. DeMasi, 234 Pa. 570; Com. v. Gar-
rito, supra.
, Com. v. Diaco, 268 Pa. 305; Com. v. DeMasi, supra.
' Com. v. Morrison, 1O3 Pa. 613.
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fendant a right to a review of alleged errors occurring during the
course of the trial, or in answers to the points and charge of the
court where he has failed to take exceptions which are still re-
quired, as in other cases, to bring such matters to the attention of
the appellate tribunal.
2 7
Formerly, the final disposition of the case by the Supreme
Court ended the proceedings, and certainly after the term no addi-
tional steps could-be taken, except as ordered in the judgment en-
tered by the appellate court.28  Thereafter, relief was to be se-
cured through the medium of the pardon board. This rule has
been, however, modified by the act of 19o3, passed, as was the act
of 1870, to meet a particular case.
Samuel Greason was convicted of murder in Berks County,
and, upon appeal, judgment of the court below was affirmed on
November 3, 1902. 2 9 On April 22, 1903,30 an act was passed giv-
ing jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the expira-
tion of the term in which the prisonerwasconvicted and sentenced,
to entertain a petition supported by after-discoveredevidence, aver-
ring ground for substantial doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.
By virtue of this legislation, it may permit the Court of Oyer and
Terminer in which the prisoner was tried to grant a rule for a new
trial nuncpro tunc;which tribunal, after hearing, can discharge the
rule; or, if sufficient grounds appear to lead to the opinion that
right and justice require a rehearing of the case, to certify this
fact to the Supreme Court, where the action taken is subject to
approval or disapproval. On May 4, advantage of the provisions
of this legislation was taken on behalf of Greason, and his petition
was presented, with the result that the record was remitted, with
leave to the court below to grant a rule for a new trial nun& pro
tunc.31 After hearing, the rule was discharged, and the appeal
which followed was dismissed.32 In but one other reported case
Com. v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465.
Schoeppe v. Com., 65 Pa. 51, 57, following Com. v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 291.
Com. v. Greason, 2o4 Pa. 64.
P. L. 245.
Greason's Petition, 205 Pa. 630.
Com. v. Greason, 2o8 Pa. i.
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has the attempt been made to secure relief under the act of 19o3,
the application being refused. 33
This brief sketch of the development of the practice upon ap-
peal in homicide cases would lead to the conclusion that hard
cases do not always make bad law, as has been so frequently said,
for the modifications resulting from the attempts to lend aid to
Schoeppe, though, as subsequent events showed, he was entirely
unworthy of sympathy, are generally recognized as wise and ben-
eficent provisions, and have seen endorsement, in part at least,
by subsequent legislative enactments.
Sylvester B. Sadler,
Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Corm. v. Hine, 213 Pa. 97.
